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The Uneasy Case for California’s
“Care Custodian” Statute
David Horton
INTRODUCTION
In about a decade, California will be “the grayest state in the nation.”1
More than six million residents—one-seventh of the population—will be
over age sixty-five.2 This demographic sea change, unprecedented
longevity,3 and the growing number of elders who opt to remain in their
own homes as they age has “push[ed] demand for home care services, such
as bathing and dressing, meal preparation and driving clients on errands.”4
Home caregivers—who earn an average of $20,283 per year5 and are
exempt from federal minimum wage and overtime laws6—will be tending
to a generation that has amassed seventy percent of the country’s wealth,7
and passes about a trillion dollars by inheritance each year.8

Lecturer in Residence, University of California, Berkeley (Boalt Hall) School of Law. J.D.,
UCLA School of Law, 2004; B.A., Carleton College, 1997.
1 Steve Geissinger, Baby Boomer Issues Looming, OAKLAND TRIB., Oct. 2, 2006, available at
2006 WLNR 17028019 (quoting California Assemblywoman Patty Berg).
2 See Jennifer Coleman, Report: California Population Will Grow Older, More Diverse, S.J.
MERCURY NEWS, Nov. 23, 2005, at B5, available at 2005 WLNR 18879683; Press Release, Governor
Schwarzenegger Announces the California Nurse Education Initiative, Apr. 13, 2005, available at
http://gov.ca.gov/index.php?/press-release/2046 (last visited June 23, 2008).
3 See, e.g., U.S. Bureau of the Census, Longevity and Health Characteristics, at 3-1, available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/1/pop/p23-190/p23190-g.pdf (last visited June 23, 2008) (noting that  “life  
expectancy  at  birth  ha[s]  reached  a  record  high”).
4 Barbara Correa, Home Sweet Home: Elderly Parents, Children Need Early Talk About Care,
DAILY NEWS (L.A.), April 3, 2008, at B1, available at 2008 WLNR 6391885; see also Sandra Block,
Elder Care Shifting From Nursing Homes, U.S.A. TODAY, June 25, 2007, at 1B, available at 2007
WLNR 11917438 (noting that the percentage of people over seventy-five in care facilities fell more
than  three  percent  from  1985  to  2004).    Even  the  “frailest  elderly  remain  in  their  own  homes.”    Michael  
Vitez, National Conference on Aging Delivers Wake-up Call to Boomers, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER,
March 11, 2007, at A4, available at 2007 WLNR 4598239.
5 See California Employment Development Department, Home Health Aid Fact Sheet, available
at http://www.calmis.ca.gov/file/HealthCare/HCC-Home-Health-Aides.pdf (last visited June 23, 2008).
6 See Long Island Care, Ltd. v. Coke, 127 S.Ct. 2339, 2345 (2007) (holding that the Fair Labor
Standards  Act  does  not  apply  to  a  “domestic  worker  who  provides  ‘companionship  services’  to  elderly  
and  infirm  men  and  women”).
7 See Marilyn Gardner, Love and Money and Fraud, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 9, 2006, at
14, available at 2006 WLNR 13703280.
8 See John Leland, Breaking the Silence, N.Y. TIMES,  Mar.  18,  2008,  at  H1  (calling  this  “[t]he  
largest   intergenerational   transfer   of   wealth   in   American   history”).      Even   after   estate   taxes,   experts  
predict that beneficiaries will receive between $24 trillion and $65.3 trillion between 1998 and 2052.
See John J. Havens & Paul G. Schervish, Why The $41 Trillion Wealth Transfer Estimate is Still Valid:
A Review of Challenges and Questions, 7 J. GIFT PLAN. 11, 49 (2003).
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At the intersection of these trends stands a novel California statute.
Probate Code section 21350 presumptively voids testamentary gifts to “a
care custodian of a dependent adult.”9 No other state bars devises to
caregivers.10 Yet Section 21350 defines “care custodian” and “dependent
adult” broadly. A “care custodian” includes any non-relative “providing
health services or social services to an elder or dependent adult.”11 A
“dependent adult” is anyone over sixty-four “whose physical or mental
abilities have diminished because of age.”12
Thus, on its face, the statute suggests that a beneficiary can forfeit a
legacy by “simply cooking for an elderly person, driving a house-bound
individual to the bank or doctor, or going shopping for them.”13 To avoid
this perverse result, California courts uniformly held that Section 21350
governed “professional ‘care custodians’”14 and not “well-meaning
friend[s].”15 Recently, however, in Bernard v. Foley,16 the California
Supreme Court rejected these views and held that the statute’s text contains
neither a “professional or occupational limitation” nor a “preexisting
personal friendship exception.”17 Despite the California Supreme Court’s
“customary and proper reticence in encouraging legislative action,”18 the
majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions in Bernard placed the onus
on the legislature to clarify the statute.19
The legislature tasked the California Law Revision Commission with
“considering the overall effectiveness of the current statutory scheme.”20
On May 14, 2008, the Commission proposed redefining (1) “care
custodian” as “a person who provides health or social services to a
dependent adult for compensation, as a profession or occupation” and (2)
“dependent adult” as a person who is eligible for appointment of a
conservator.21

CAL. PROB. CODE § 21350(a)(6) (West 2007).
See Jessica Garrison, Caregivers’   Inheritance Is Blocked, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2006, at 3,
available at 2006 WLNR 14500607.
11 See CAL. PROB. CODE § 21350(c) (West 2007); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 15610.17(y)
(West 2007).
12 See CAL. PROB. CODE § 21350(c) (West 2007); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 15610.23(a)
(West 2007).
13 In re Conservatorship of Estate of Davidson, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 702, 711–12 (Ct. App. 2003).
14 Id. at 713.
15 In re Conservatorship of McDowell, 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 10, 22 (Ct. App. 2004).
16 139 P.3d 1196 (Cal. 2006).
17 Id. at 1204–05.
18 Bernard, 139 P.3d at 1210 (George, C.J., concurring).
19 See id. at 1207–08  (“In  the  event,  however,  we  have  mistaken  the  Legislature’s  intention,  that  
body  may  readily  correct  our  error.”);;  id.  at  1210  (George,  C.J.,  concurring)  (“[T]he  Legislature would
do   well   to   consider   modifying   or   augmenting   the   relevant   provisions”);;   id. at 1214 (Corrigan, J.,
dissenting)  (“[T]here  is  no  reason  to  believe  the  Legislature  intended  such  an  outcome.”).
20 See ASSEMB. B. 2034, 2005–2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2006), available at http://
www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/05-06/bill/asm/ab_2001-2050/ab_2034_bill_20060907_chaptered.pdf.
21 See Cal.   Law   Revision   Comm’n,   Memorandum   2008-21, Study L-622, Donative Transfer
Restrictions, May 14, 2008, at 19–20, available at http://clrc.ca.gov/pub/2008/MM08-21.pdf.
9
10
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These amendments would limit the statute and thus vastly improve it.
Yet despite the Law Revision Commission’s license to re-imagine the law,
it accepts the premise that byzantine rules must regulate devises to
caregivers. I respectfully challenge that assumption. I highlight four points
that I believe have not received their due in the debate over how to reform
Section 21350. The first is that California courts uniquely respect
testamentary autonomy. In other states, scholars complain that “courts are
as committed to ensuring that testators devise their estates in accordance
with prevailing normative views as they are to effectuating testamentary
intent.”22 This is not so in California. The “care custodian” provision—
which substitutes a categorical legislative determination for a testator’s
express wishes—deviates from this tradition. Second, the legislature
enacted Section 21350 to create a presumption of wrongdoing when
lawyers receive devises in estate plans they had authored. However,
California common law already recognized that exact presumption. Thus,
the statute changed little about a lawyer’s right to inherit from a client. Yet
when with little fanfare the legislature extended the statute to caregivers, it
fundamentally altered a caregiver’s ability to accept a legacy from a
patient. At the same time, the good reasons to preclude lawyers from
profiting from their own draftsmanship do not apply to caregivers.
Third, the Law Revision Commission offers three rationales for
retaining the “care custodian” clause: (1) caregivers have the opportunity to
exert undue influence; (2) elders depend on caregivers; and (3) gifts to
caregivers seem inherently “undue.”23 To be sure, caregivers enjoy
dominion over impaired elders. Yet caregivers provide services that, even
if remunerated, are selfless and socially beneficial. As a normative matter,
it is unclear why gifts to caregivers should be suspect. Fourth, an inflexible
rule is not a good fit for the deeply personal question of a testator’s intent.
The undue influence doctrine covers the same terrain at less risk of
disregarding autonomy or penalizing kindness.24
This essay contains two parts. Part I sketches the history of the “care
custodian” provision and the cases that have struggled to interpret it. Part
II examines the Law Revision Commission’s tentative recommendations
and concludes that, although they would enhance the “care custodian”
provision, they would not preclude it from causing dubious results.

Melanie B. Leslie, The Myth of Testamentary Freedom, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 235, 236 (1996).
See Cal.  Law  Revision  Comm’n, supra note 21, at 7–8.
California’s   potent   Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act also provides for
treble  damages,  recovery  for  pain  and  suffering,  and  attorneys’  fees  in  elder  abuse  actions.     See CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 15600–15675 (West 2007).
22
23
24
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I. TESTAMENTARY AUTONOMY IN CALIFORNIA, SECTION 21350,
AND THE “CARE CUSTODIAN” STATUTE
“[V]irtually the entire law of wills derives from the premise that an
owner is entitled to dispose of his property as he pleases in death as in
life.”25 Thus, courts often make grandiose statements about testamentary
autonomy. For example, “the right to testamentary disposition of one’s
property is a fundamental one which reaches back to the early common
law,”26 “does not depend upon its judicious use,”27 and includes the
prerogative “to make an unjust or an unreasonable or even a cruel will.”28
Yet all states regulate testamentary gifts. The most common reasons
courts refuse to enforce an otherwise valid will are the doctrines of
incapacity and undue influence.29 Incapacity requires proof that at the time
the testator signed the will, she could not understand (1) the meaning of the
testamentary act, (2) the extent of her property, and (3) her important
relationships.30 Undue influence is more complex. Indeed, all wills stem
from influence.31 Thus, courts hold that influence is “undue” only when it
is “brought to bear directly on the testamentary act, sufficient to overcome
the testator’s free will, amounting in effect to coercion destroying the
testator’s free agency.”32 Cases usually hinge on whether a contestant has
raised a presumption of undue influence. To do so, a contestant must prove
that (1) the testator and the defendant had a confidential relationship, (2)
the defendant actively participated in the will’s preparation or execution,
and (3) the defendant unduly profited from the will.33 If a contestant
establishes these elements, the burden shifts to the defendant to show an
absence of undue influence by a preponderance of the evidence.34
In most jurisdictions, scholars complain that courts use these rules to
impose hegemonic norms.35 In re Kaufmann’s Will36 is an oft-cited
25 John H. Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 489, 491
(1975). I will use the terms, “testator”  and  “will,”  even  though  this  essay  pertains  equally  to  trusts.
26 In re Fritschi’s  Estate,  384  P.2d  656,  659  (Cal  1963).
27 In re McDevitt’s  Estate,  30  P.  101,  106 (Cal. 1892).
28 In re Martin’s  Estate,  151  P.  138,  141  (Cal.  1915).
29 Fraud can also invalidate a will, although it appears less often in cases. See Estate of Newhall,
214  P.  231,  235  (Cal.  1923)  (“[F]alse  representations . . . have been held to constitute fraud if it can be
shown that they were designed to and did deceive the testator into making a will different in its terms
from  that  which  he  would  have  made  had  he  not  been  misled.”).
30 See In re Conservatorship of Bookasta, 265 Cal. Rptr. 1, 3 (Ct. App. 1989).
31 See, e.g., Ray D. Madoff, Unmaking Undue Influence, 81 MINN. L. REV. 571, 575 (1997).
32 Rice v. Clark, 47 P.3d 300, 304 (Cal. 2002).
33 See Estate of Sarabia, 270 Cal. Rptr. 560, 563 (Ct. App. 1990).
34 See id. A contestant does not need to establish the presumption to win. See David v.
Hermann,  28  Cal.  Rptr.  3d  622,  631  (Ct.  App.  2005)  (finding  the  trial  court  properly  “did  not  rely  on  the  
presumption, but rather applied the general principle of undue influence to a review of all the
evidence”).
35 Madoff, supra note 31, at 576  (“[T]he  undue  influence  doctrine  denies  freedom  of  testation  for  
people who deviate from judicially imposed testamentary norms—in particular, the norm that people
should  provide  for  their  families”);;  see also Jeffrey G. Sherman, Undue Influence and the Homosexual
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example of this tendency. In that case, Robert Kaufmann, the scion of a
wealthy jeweler, left his estate to his lover and business partner, Walter
Weiss, instead of his brothers, Joel and Aron. Robert enclosed a letter with
his will that articulated his profound feelings for Walter.37 Nevertheless, a
New York appellate court concluded that the will stemmed from Walter’s
undue influence. The court expressed doubt that Robert could have chosen
to bequeath his fortune to an “unrelated” person.38 It then dismissed the
letter as “utterly unreal, highly exaggerated and pitched to a state of fervor
and ecstasy.”39
Cases such as Kaufmann have prompted some
commentators to declare that incapacity and undue influence serve, “not to
protect freedom of testation, but rather to protect the testator’s family
against disinheritance.”40
California jurisprudence has been far more protective of idiosyncrasy.
A mid-century study found that in contests—generally brought by unhappy
heirs-at-law—juries invalidated legacies seventy-seven percent of the
time.41 Yet appellate courts reversed a whopping fifty percent of these
verdicts for insufficient evidence.42 Rather than insulating juries from
reviewing courts, in 1988 the legislature eliminated the right to a jury trial
for will contests.43 Thus, the state has a tradition of taking testamentary
freedom seriously.
Three doctrinal nuances illustrate this point. First, in capacity cases,
California courts have insisted that a contestant prove that the testator was
of “unsound mind” at the very moment she executed the will.44 They thus
have rejected incapacity claims, even when faced with strong evidence of
testator impairment before and after the signing. In Estate of Mann,45 for
Testator, 42 U. PITT. L. REV. 225,   267   (1981)   (“[T]estamentary   plans   will   continue   to   be   unduly  
jeopardized so long as courts regard homosexuality as a special case”);;  Leslie,   supra note 22, at 236;
Frances H. Foster, The Family Paradigm of Inheritance Law, 80 N.C. L. REV. 199, 210 (2001)
(asserting   that   courts   “manipulate   mental   capacity   doctrines   such   as   ‘undue   influence’ . . . to reach
results  more  in  accord  with  the  family  paradigm”).
36 247 N.Y.S.2d 664 (App. Div. 1964).
37 The letter left no doubt that Robert was in love with Walter:
Walter gave me the courage to start something which slowly but eventually permitted me
to supply for myself everything my life had heretofore lacked: an outlet for my long-latent
but strong creative ability in painting . . . a balanced, healthy sex life which before had
been spotty, furtive and destructive; an ability to reorientate myself to actual life and to
face it calmly and realistically. All of this adds up to Peace of Mind—and what a delight,
what a relief after so many wasted, dark, groping, fumbling immature years to be reborn
and become adult!
Id. at 671.
38 Indeed, the court  telegraphs  its  holding  in  the  opinion’s  second  sentence.    See id. at  665  (“The  
contestants are the distributes of  and  the  proponent  is  unrelated  to  the  decedent.”).
39 Id. at 674.
40 Madoff, supra note 31, at 619.
41 See Note, Will Contests on Trial, 6 STAN. L. REV. 91, 92 (1953).
42 See id. at 92 n.4.
43 See CAL. PROB. CODE §   8252(b)   (West   2007)   (“The   court   shall   try   and   determine   any  
contested  issue  of  fact  that  affects  the  validity  of  the  will.”).
44 In re Lingenfelter’s  Estate,  241  P.2d  990,  996  (Cal.  1952).
45 229 Cal. Rptr. 225 (Ct. App. 1986).
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example, the testator had dementia and was placed under a conservatorship.
She was “not eating or caring for herself properly; . . .she was unclean and
smelled like urine,” and would often “forget[ ] dates, the time of year, and
what she was doing.”46 Nevertheless, the court of appeal reversed a jury
determination of incapacity because the only witnesses to the will’s
execution “all testified decedent was aware of what she was doing at the
time.”47
Second, in undue influence cases, most states deem a beneficiary to
have “actively participated” in the will’s creation if she “directed the
testator to the drafting lawyer, made the appointment for the testator, or
even merely knew of the contents of the will.”48 However in California,
“the mere fact of the beneficiary procuring an attorney to prepare the will is
not sufficient.”49 For instance, in Estate of Fritschi,50 the California
Supreme Court held that the testator’s mistress did not “actively
participate” in a will that favored her to the detriment of the testator’s
children even though she attended discussions about the estate plan, located
a witness for the will, gave the testator a pen, and remained just outside the
room.
Third, most jurisdictions do not look beyond whether a beneficiary is
related to a testator when deciding whether she would “unduly profit”:
A ‘natural’ disposition is one which provides for a testator’s heirs at law. As one
court succinctly put it: ‘[T]he natural object of a will maker’s bounty is one
related to him/her by consanguinity.’ The status of the beneficiary, rather than
the quality of the beneficiary’s relationship to the testator, determines what is a
natural disposition for purposes of the undue influence analysis. In determining
status, courts have generally relied on the intestacy statutes as a model for
naturalness.51

California takes the opposite approach. For example, in Estate of
Sarabia52—a case that provides a vivid counterpoint to Kaufmann—
Guillermo Sarabia, an opera singer, left his estate to his agent and
companion, Leonard Gibbs.53 Sarabia’s brother filed a contest, arguing that
Gibbs’s profit was “undue” since he was not related to Sarabia and would
take nothing without the will.54 The court of appeal disagreed, reasoning
that a fact-finder must place itself in a testator’s shoes to determine whether
profit is “undue”:

46
47
48
49
50
51

1995)).
52
53
54

Id. at 227–28.
Id. at 230.
Madoff, supra note 31, at 587.
See Estate of Bould, 287 P.2d 8, 16 (Cal. Ct. App. 1955) (collecting cases).
384 P.2d 656, 661 (Cal. 1963).
Madoff, supra note 31, at 590–91 (quoting In re Estate of Maheras, 897 P.2d 268, 273 (Okla.
270 Cal. Rptr. 560 (Ct. App. 1990).
Id. at 561.
See id. at 563.
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For the trier of fact to decide what influence was ‘undue’ clearly entails a
qualitative assessment of the relationship between the decedent and the
beneficiary. . .. The trier of fact derives from the evidence introduced an
appreciation of the respective relative standings of the beneficiary and the
contestant to the decedent in order that the trier of fact can determine which party
would be the more obvious object of the decedent’s testamentary disposition.55

Thus, because Sarabia was less close to his brother than to Gibbs, the court
held that Gibbs’s profit was not “undue.”56
Yet, as protective as California courts were of testamentary autonomy,
they regarded one class of bequests as suspect—those to the drafting
attorney. Such devises automatically gave rise to a presumption of undue
influence.57 This bright-line rule made sense; by definition, the drafting
attorney enjoys a confidential relationship with the testator and plays an
active role in the will’s preparation and execution. Although the drafting
attorney might not unduly profit from the will, lawyers are fiduciaries for
their clients, and thus “proof that the benefit to an attorney was ‘undue’ is
not required to trigger a presumption of undue influence.”58 Similarly,
courts held lawyers to a higher standard for rebutting the presumption,
requiring “clear and satisfactory evidence.”59
In sum, freedom of testation was not just lofty rhetoric in California;
rather, it was woven into the fabric of the common law. Events in the early
1990’s would test these principles.
A.

Section 21350

In 1992, the Los Angeles Times published a searing exposé of James
D. Gunderson, an Orange County lawyer who had written himself into
many of his elderly clients’ estate plans.60 From his law offices inside
Leisure World—a gated retirement community so large it became its own
municipality61—Gunderson routinely prepared wills that lavished bequests
upon himself.62 These gifts included $3.5 million from a 98-year-old blind
Id. at 564.
See id. at 565–66.
See Estate of Lind, 257 Cal. Rptr. 853, 856 (Ct. App. 1989); see also Estate of Auen, 35 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 557, 562–63  (Ct.  App.  1994)  (rejecting  attorney’s  claim  that  the  traditional  three-element test
for the presumption of undue influence applies). Similarly, Probate Code section 6112 creates a
presumption   of   “duress,   menace,   fraud,   or   undue   influence”   for   testamentary   gifts   to   a   necessary  
subscribing witness. Section 6112 actually liberalized this rule; previously, such gifts were absolutely
void  to  the  extent  they  exceeded  the  witness’s  intestate  share.    See CAL. PROB. CODE § 51, repealed by
Stats. 1983, c. 842, § 18, operative Jan. 1, 1985.
58 Auen, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 562.
59 In re Phillipi’s   Estate,   172   P.2d   377,   378   (Cal.   Ct.   App.   1946).      Conversely,   an   interested  
witness—like a defendant in a common law undue influence action—must refute the presumption of
invalidity by a preponderance of the evidence. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 6112 (West 2007).
60 See Davan Maharaj, Lawyer Inherited Millions in Stock, Cash From Clients, L.A. TIMES, Nov.
22, 1992, at A1, available at 1992 WLNR 4030163.
61 See California Retirement Community to Become City of Seniors, Mar. 3, 1999, available at
http://www.cnn.com/US/9903/03/leisure.world.01 (last visited June 30, 2008).
62 See Davan Maharaj, Leisure World Lawyer Heir to Clients' Millions, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 22,
55
56
57
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and deaf man63 and $250,000 from a woman whom Gunderson had
described in court papers as “unable to pay her bills or manage her
assets.”64 Gunderson also peppered his instruments with clauses that
shifted tax liability to other beneficiaries65 and insulated his “inheritance”
from contests.66
The articles sparked outrage and threatened to eviscerate the standing
of the probate bar and bench.67 The California Legislature responded
swiftly. Less than a year after the stories broke, it passed a bill—A.B. 21—
to “unambiguously prohibit the most patently offensive actions of
Gunderson.”68 A.B. 21 created Probate Code section 21350, which
invalidates transfers to “disqualified person[s]”: the drafting attorney, their
family, their law partners, and their employees.69 New Section 21351
carved out narrow exceptions. The first is for the transferor’s relatives and
1992, at A1, available at 1992 WLNR 4029997.
63 See An Maharaj, 4 Clients Whose Estates Enriched James D. Gunderson: Merrill A. Miller,
L.A. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1992, at A43, available at 1992 WLNR 4029597 [hereinafter, Maharaj, Merrill A.
Miller].
64 See Davan Maharaj, 4 Clients Whose Estates Enriched James D. Gunderson: Emerald Mary
Sully, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1992, at A43, available at 1992 WLNR 4027557; see also Davan Maharaj,
4 Clients Whose Estates Enriched James D. Gunderson: Margaret Hough, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1992,
at A43, available at 1992 WLNR 4029045 (describing a conveyance of real property that Gunderson
recorded in his favor a year after the owner had died); Davan Maharaj, 4 Clients Whose Estates
Enriched James D. Gunderson: Martin L. Fisher, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1992, at A43, available at 1992
WLNR 4027466 (describing Gunderson receiving ninety-nine  percent  of  a  client’s  estate). The story
soon went national. See Judge Removes Attorney as Trustee, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1992, at A6,
available at 1992 WLNR 149893; Attorney Investigated for Estate Dealings, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 14,
1992, at A12, available at 1992 WLNR 1087089; Lawyer   Stripped   of   Control   of   Elderly   Clients’  
Money, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Dec. 14, 1992, at A8, available at 1992 WLNR 4370156; California
Lawyer Queried on Wills, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 14, 1992, at 6, available at 1992 WLNR 1852585.
65 See Maharaj, Merrill A. Miller, supra note 63.
66 See Davan Maharaj, Bill  Targets  “No  Contest”  Estate  Ploy, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1992, at B1,
available at 1992 WLNR 4009546.
67 See Editorial, Laws Must Be Toughened to Protect the Elderly from Exploitation, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 25, 1992, at B6, available at 1992   WLNR   4036978   (“38   other   states   have   adopted   tougher  
guidelines set by the American Bar Assn. prohibiting lawyers, under threat of disbarment, from
preparing  trusts   or   wills   in   which   they   are   beneficiaries.   California   should   do  the   same.”);;   George   C.  
Balderas, Letter to the Editor, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1992, at B11, available at 1992 WLNR 4017373
(describing  a  talk  radio  show  which  featured  “a  string of callers all relating negative experiences with
their  attorneys.”);;  Robert  R.  Shively,  Letter  to  the  Editor,  L.A. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1992, at B11, available
at 1992   WLNR   4018065   (“[H]ow   did   Mr.   Gunderson   persuade   Superior   Court   probate   judges   to  
approve such  wills  for  probate?”).    High-level figures tried to control the damage. The president of the
State  Bar  of  California  “stress[ed]  how  important  it  is  for  any  person  who  questions  the  actions  of  an  
attorney  to  report  this  behavior.”    Harvey  I.  Saferstein, Letter to the Editor, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1992, at
B6, available at 1992 WLNR 4065722. The Supervising Judge of the Orange County Probate
Department  called  for  “a  comprehensive  review  of  the  Probate  Code,  the  Probate  Court  Rules  and  the  
Attorney Rules of Ethics.”      Tully   H.   Seymor,   Living Trusts, Probate Court Duties in Supervising
Estates Reviewed, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1992, at B6, available at 1992 WLNR 4071077.
68 ASSEMB. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, B. ANALYSIS., A.B. 21, 1993–1994 Leg., Reg. Sess.(Cal.
1993)   (“AB   21   was   introduced   in   response   to . . . the activities of a probate attorney, Mr. James D.
Gunderson,   from   Orange   County”),   available at http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/93-94/bill/asm/ab_00010050/ab_21_cfa_930208_101917_asm_comm.
69 See CAL. PROB. CODE § 21350(a)(1)–(3) (West 2007); id. § 21350.5. The bill also made
“[a]ny  person  who  has  a  fiduciary  relationship  with  the  transferor . . . who transcribes the instrument or
causes  it  to  be  transcribed”  a  “disqualified  person.”    Id. § 21350(a)(4).
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spouse or domestic partner.70 Another requires a neutral lawyer to attest in
a “certificate of independent review” that the gift was voluntary.71 A third
permits the lawyer to prove that “the transfer was not the product of fraud,
menace, duress, or undue influence” (1) by clear and convincing evidence,
(2) not based solely on the testimony of any “disqualified person.”72 If the
lawyer fails, she must pay the contestant’s costs and attorneys’ fees.73
Some lawmakers, including Governor Wilson, and members of the
press saw the statute as a potent weapon against financial elder abuse.74
Yet rather than blazing a trail, the statute largely codified the common law.
As noted, California courts already assumed that devises to drafting
attorneys flowed from undue influence75 and required “clear and
satisfactory evidence” to overcome this presumption.76 To be sure, Section
21350 also prohibited drafting attorneys from carrying their burden with
their own testimony and saddled them with paying a successful contestant’s
attorneys’ fees and costs.77 Ironically, though, its next biggest change was
probably to create exceptions to what had been an inflexible presumption
of invalidity.78 Thus, perceptions notwithstanding, Section 21350 did little
to change the state of the law.
B.

The “Care Custodian” Provision

In 1997, the state’s booming in-home care industry led the Trusts and
Estates Section of the Bar to sponsor a novel amendment to the statute.
The Trusts and Estates Section was concerned about the sway that
“practical nurse[s]” and others “hired to provide in-home care” have over
“demented elder[s].”79 The legislature responded with A.B. 1172. Noting
that “practical nurses or other caregivers hired to provide in-home care. . .
are often working alone and in a position to take advantage of the person
they are caring for,”80 the legislature added a “care custodian of a
See id. § 21351(a).
See id. § 21351(b).
See id. § 21351(d).    As  originally  enacted,  the  statute  excluded  testimony  from  all  “disqualified  
persons.”    See CAL. PROB. CODE § 21351(d) (2001), amended by Stats. 2002, c. 412 (S.B.1575), § 1.
73 See id.
74 See Davan Maharaj, Wilson Signs Bill to Protect Estates of the Elderly, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 3,
1993, at B1, available at 1993  WLNR  4201678  (quoting  Wilson  as  declaring  that  section  21350  “gives  
the state sufficient ammunition against these legal vultures who are preying on the vulnerable members
of  our  society.”)
75 See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
76 See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
77 See supra notes 71–72 and accompanying text.
78 See supra note 70.
79 California Law Revision Commission, Study L-622, Mar. 10, 2008, at 2, available at
http://www.clrc.ca.gov/pub/2008/MM08-13.pdf (last visited June 30, 2008) (quoting Letter from Don
Green and Marc B. Hankin to David Long, State Bar of California Director of Research, Oct. 16, 1996)
(“A   ‘practical   nurse’   (or   other   caregiver   hired   to   provide   in-home care for an aging progressive
dementia victim) might find it too easy to take advantage of the dependence and close working
relationship to induce the demented elder  to  make  testamentary  gifts”).
80 S. RULES COMM., B. ANALYSIS, ASSEMB. B. 1172, 1997–1998 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. Aug.8,
1997), available at http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/97-98/bill/asm/ab_1151-1200/ab_1172_cfa_19970828_
70
71
72
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dependent adult”   to   Section 21350’s litany of “disqualified person[s].”81
Thus, the statute now reads:
[N]o provision, or provisions, of any instrument shall be valid to make any
donative transfer to any of the following: (1) The person who drafted the
instrument. (2) A person who is related by blood or marriage to, is a domestic
partner of, is a cohabitant with, or is an employee of, the person who drafted the
instrument. (3) Any partner or shareholder of any law partnership or law
corporation in which the person described in paragraph (1) has an ownership
interest, and any employee of that law partnership or law corporation. . .. (6) A
care custodian of a dependent adult who is the transferor. 82

The statute defines “dependent adult” and “care custodian” broadly.
Even though the Trusts and Estates Section described the protected class as
“dementia victim[s],”83 the term “dependent adult” includes anyone over
sixty-four “whose physical or mental abilities have diminished because of
age.”84 Likewise, despite the legislature’s preoccupation with nurses
“hired [for] in-home care,”85 the term “care custodian” includes a catalog
of specific entities and individuals, plus a sweeping catch-all: “[a]ny other.
. . person providing health services or social services to elders or dependent
adults.”86 This liberal scope would soon cause mischief.
193607_sen_floor.html.
81 CAL. PROB. CODE § 21350(a)(6) (West 2007).
82 Id. § 21350(a).
83 California Law Revision Commission, Study L-622, supra note 79.
84 See CAL. PROB. CODE §  21350(c)  (West  2007)  (“[T]he  term  ‘dependent  adult’  has  the  meaning
as set forth in Section 15610.23 of the Welfare and Institutions Code and also includes those persons
who . . .  are  older  than  age  64”);;  CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 15610.23(a) (West 2007).
85 S. RULES COMM., B. ANALYSIS, ASSEMB. B. 1172, 1997–1998 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. Aug. 8,
1997), available at http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/97-98/bill/asm/ab_1151-1200/ab_1172_cfa_19970828_
193607_sen_floor.html.
86 See CAL. PROB. CODE §  21350(c)  (West  2007)  (“The  term  ‘care  custodian’  has  the  meaning  as  
set forth in Section   15610.17   of   the   Welfare   and   Institutions   Code.”);;   CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §
15610.17(y) (West 2007). In full, Welfare and Institutions Code section 15610.17 states:
‘Care  custodian’  means  an  administrator  or  an  employee  of  any  of  the  following  public  or
private facilities or agencies, or persons providing care or services for elders or dependent
adults, including members of the support staff and maintenance staff: [¶] (a) Twenty-fourhour health facilities, as defined in Sections 1250, 1250.2, and 1250.3 of the Health and
Safety Code. [¶] (b) Clinics. [¶] (c) Home health agencies. [¶] (d) Agencies providing
publicly funded in-home supportive services, nutrition services, or other home and
community-based support services. [¶] (e) Adult day health care centers and adult day care.
[¶] (f) Secondary schools that serve 18- to 22-year-old dependent adults and postsecondary
educational institutions that serve dependent adults or elders. [¶] (g) Independent living
centers. [¶] (h) Camps. [¶] (i) Alzheimer's Disease day care resource centers. [¶] (j)
Community care facilities, as defined in Section 1502 of the Health and Safety Code, and
residential care facilities for the elderly, as defined in Section 1569.2 of the Health and
Safety Code. [¶] (k) Respite care facilities. [¶] (l) Foster homes. [¶] (m) Vocational
rehabilitation facilities and work activity centers. [¶] (n) Designated area agencies on aging.
[¶] (o) Regional centers for persons with developmental disabilities. [¶] (p) State
Department of Social Services and State Department of Health Services licensing divisions.
[¶]  (q)  County  welfare  departments.  [¶]  (r)  Offices  of  patients’  rights  advocates  and  clients’  
rights advocates, including attorneys. [¶] (s) The office of the long-term care ombudsman.
[¶] (t) Offices of public conservators, public guardians, and court investigators. [¶] (u) Any
protection or advocacy agency or entity that is designated by the Governor to fulfill the
requirements and assurances of the following: [¶] (1) The federal Developmental
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Cases Interpreting the “Care Custodian” Provision

The “care custodian” statute first reared its head in Estate of Shinkle.87
Laverne Shinkle was seventy-seven years old and in poor health. Her
closest relative was a cousin she had not seen for forty years. 88 After she
fractured a hip at home, she recovered at South Valley Hospital, a skilled
nursing facility. There she met C.J. Thompson, the volunteer long-term
care ombudsman.89 Despite rules prohibiting ombudsmen from befriending
patients, Thompson helped Shinkle run errands, pay her bills, and balance
her checkbook. Even when he was sent to another facility and she returned
home, he visited her. When she said she wanted to leave her property to
him, he arranged for her to consult with an estate planner.90
The trial court struck down the devise to Thompson and the courts of
appeal affirmed. The court of appeal explained that the definition of “care
custodian” expressly includes a “long-term care ombudsman.”91 In
response, Thompson asserted that his transfer and Shinkle’s discharge from
the facility meant that he was not her ombudsman at the time she executed
the trust.92 He cast himself as “only an ‘informal friend,’ providing
‘friendly aid to an at-home individual.’”93 The court was not persuaded. It
held that Thompson’s ombudsman status helped him meet Shinkle, earn her
confidence, and learn intimate details about her.94 It then refused to disturb
the trial court’s finding that Thompson had not disproved undue influence
under Section 21351.95
Two years later, In re Conservatorship of Estate of Davidson96
wrestled with whether a good friend provided “health services or social
services” and thus was a disqualified “care custodian.” In the 1960’s,
Dolores Davidson and her husband met Stephen Gungl and his partner.
Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 2000, contained in Chapter 144
(commencing with Section 15001) of Title 42 of the United States Code, for protection and
advocacy of the rights of persons with developmental disabilities. [¶] (2) The Protection
and Advocacy for the Mentally Ill Individuals Act of 1986, as amended, contained in
Chapter 114 (commencing with Section 10801) of Title 42 of the United States Code, for
the protection and advocacy of the rights of persons with mental illness. [¶] (v) Humane
societies and animal control agencies. [¶] (w) Fire departments. [¶] (x) Offices of
environmental health and building code enforcement. [¶] (y) Any other protective, public,
sectarian, mental health, or private assistance or advocacy agency or person providing
health services or social services to elders or dependent adults.
87 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d 42 (Ct. App. 2002).
88 Id. at 50.
89 Ombudsmen are trained, state-certified   volunteers   who   “serve   as   advocates   for   residents   in  
long-term-care facilities.”    Id. at 44.
90 See id. at 46.
91 See id. at  53  (explaining  that  “care  custodian”  includes  “‘an  employee  of . . . [t]he office of the
long-term  care  ombudsman’”)  (quoting  CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 15610.17(s)).
92 See id. at 54.
93 Id.
94 See id. (“But for the ombudsman program, Thompson would not have met Shinkle, would not
have  had  access  to  her  financial  and  personal  information,  and  would  not  have  gained  her  trust.”).
95 See id. at 56.
96 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 702 (Ct. App. 2003).
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The two couples forged a close bond, and spent birthdays, anniversaries,
and holidays together.97 About ten years later, Davidson’s husband died.
Gungl visited often, helped out around the house, and, when Davidson
could no longer drive, he chauffeured her. Davidson called Gungl and his
partner “her boys.”98 In 1990, she executed a will leaving her estate to her
cousin, Elaine Morken.
In 1992, Davidson began to decline. Gungl and his partner cooked,
gardened, and banked for Davidson, bought her groceries and medications,
and drove her to the doctor.99 In 1995, Gungl, who was revising his and his
mother’s estate plan, recommended that Davidson place her assets in a
trust. In 1996, Davidson signed an instrument that left $5,000 to Morken
and the balance of her estate to Gungl. In 1998, Morken and her
husband—who only saw Davidson a few times a year—learned about the
new estate plan.100 They complained to the public guardian about Gungl
and asked the court to appoint a conservator for Davidson. In the
conservatorship proceeding, Gungl submitted an accounting that revealed
he had written twenty-four checks from Davidson to himself that he had
labeled “salary” or wages.”101 When Davidson died in 2000, Morkin’s
husband102 challenged the trust under Section 21350.
The trial court determined that Section 21350 did not apply to Gungl.
The court of appeal affirmed on three independent grounds. First, the court
held that Gungl’s sporadic acts of kindness were “unsophisticated care and
attention,” not “health services or social services.”103 The court reasoned
that a contrary result would penalize good Samaritans:
[V]irtually any individual providing personal care to a dependent adult, no matter
how intimately and personally connected they might be, would be disqualified
from receiving a gift, bequest, devise, or other donative transfer from the
dependent adult under a trust or will unless they were related to the dependent by
blood or marriage. Appellant’s interpretation of ‘care custodian’ is so broad as to
include not only the provision of health care or social services, but such acts as
simply cooking for an elderly person, driving a house-bound individual to the
bank or doctor, or going shopping for them.104

Second, the court examined the history of the “care custodian”  
provision and found that the legislature meant to bar gifts only to
professional caregivers.105
The court admitted that Davidson had
See id. at 705.
See id.
See id. at 706, 712.
100 See id. at 707. Davidson was wary that the Morkens intended to place her in a nursing home
and seize control of her financial affairs. See id.
101 See id. at 716. The court in the conservatorship proceeding surcharged Gungl for $7,782.70 of
unaccounted   expenses.      Although   it   called   Gungl’s   “actions . . . sloppy, disorganized, and often
unwise,”  it  refused  to  find  that  Gungl  acted  in  bad  faith.    See id. at 716 n.12.
102 Elaine Morken died shortly before Davidson. See id. at 705.
103 Id. at 713.
104 Id. at 711–12.
105 See id. at 713–14.
97
98
99
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compensated Gungl for his services.106 Nevertheless, it credited Gungl’s
testimony that he simply used this money to reimburse himself for out-ofpocket expenses.107 Third, the court determined that the statute did not
apply to people like Gungl, whose “provision of care developed naturally
from a preexisting genuinely personal relationship.”108 Finally, even
assuming that Gungl was a “care custodian,” the court held that he had
carried his burden under Section 21351 of proving that “Davidson’s
decision to leave the bulk of her estate to [him] rather than the Morkens
was based on a long-standing affectionate relationship between the two,
and not undue influence.” 109
Similarly, In re Conservatorship of McDowell110 held that Section
21350 did not apply to a “well-meaning friend.” In February, 2000,
Kathryn McDowell, a retiree, met Ann Netcharu.111 Netcharu bought
McDowell coffee and food. When McDowell returned from a stint in the
hospital that summer, Netcharu washed her and changed her diapers.112 In
August, the court appointed a public guardian as McDowell’s
conservator.113 In September, 2000, Netcharu took McDowell to three
different lawyers before finding one willing to draft a will. McDowell left
half of her estate to Netcharu. Before she signed the will, she said she
relied on Netcharu “for medical care, home maintenance, food and
clothing,” and wanted to leave her money “because [she] was assisting
her.”114 The public guardian sought to nullify that will and create a new
one leaving McDowell’s estate to charity.115 The trial court granted the
petition and held that Section 21350 voided the gift to Netcharu.116
The court of appeal reversed, acknowledging that McDowell had
known Netcharu for a mere six months when she executed her estate

Id. at 716.
Id. at 717 & n.13.
Id. at 716. The court articulated a three-factor test to determine whether an individual is a
“care  custodian”:  “(1)  the  length  of  time  the  individuals  had a personal relationship before assuming the
roles of caregiver and recipient; (2) the closeness and authenticity of the personal relationship; and (3)
whether  any  money  was  paid  for  the  provision  of  care.”    Id.
109 Id. at 719. Oddly, the court then held that   Morken’s   husband   had   failed   to   establish   a  
presumption of common law undue influence, reasoning that Gungl neither actively participated in the
execution of the trust nor unduly benefited. See id. at 721–22. The court had already opined that Gungl
had met his burden under section 21351 of disproving undue influence by clear and convincing
evidence—a more rigorous showing than that required to rebut the conventional presumption of undue
influence.    Thus,  the  issue  of  whether  Morken’s  husband  had  established a presumption of common law
undue influence should have been superfluous.
110 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 10 (Ct. App. 2004).
111 See id. at 16.
112 See id.
113 See id. at 12.
114 Id. at 17.
115 See id. at 13. This procedure, where a conservator seeks court permission to take an action on
behalf of the conservatee, is   called   a   “petition   for   substituted   judgment.”      See CAL. PROB. CODE §
2580(a) (West 2007).
116 See McDowell, 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d. at 13.
106
107
108
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plan.117 Nevertheless, relying heavily on Davidson, it reasoned that
Netcharu did not provide “health services or social services” because she
had never engaged in care-giving in any other capacity:
[T]here is no evidence [Netcharu] generally offered care services to the elderly
and dependent adult population as a paid or volunteer provider. Nor is there
evidence that [her] relationship with Ms. McDowell grew out of a preexisting
professional or occupational connection or that [Netcharu] and Ms. McDowell
had a quid pro quo arrangement, under which Ms. McDowell reasonably
expected [Netcharu] to provide care, and [Netcharu] reasonably expected
something in return. Rather, the court found that [Netcharu] was a well-meaning
friend.118

Thus, the court of appeal remanded the case for the lower court to consider
the conservator’s other claims: whether the doctrines of incapacity and
undue influence vitiated the will.119
But two years later, in Bernard v. Foley,120 the California Supreme
Court saw the statute through a different prism than Shinkle, Davidson, or
McDowell. James Foley and his girlfriend, Ann Erman, were Carmel
Bosco’s “longtime personal friends.”121 In 1991, Bosco created a trust that
left her sister, Ann Cassell, a third of her estate, and made other relatives
residual beneficiaries.122 Over the next decade, Bosco amended her trust
three times, naming different trustees, but preserving her original
dispositional scheme.123
In 2001, Bosco learned that she had cancer.124 On June 12, 2001, she
amended her trust again, nominating Foley as successor trustee. This was
the first time she had mentioned either Foley or Erman in her estate plan.
In July, at Erman’s “repeated urging,” Bosco moved in with her and
Foley.125 Bosco could not care for herself, and so Erman and Foley
shopped for her, cooked for her, managed her finances, cleaned her room,
did her laundry, bathed her, changed her diapers, and administered an array
of medications.126 In August and September of 2001, Bosco amended her
trust twice more, giving Foley additional power as trustee and removing
devises to other relatives.127 Finally, on September 25, she signed the
seventh amendment, which left “the ‘lion’s share’” of her property to Foley
and Erman.128 She died three days later.129
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129

See id. at 22.
Id. at 21–22.
See id. at 26.
139 P.3d 1196 (Cal. 2006).
Id.  at  1197.    Erman,  in  fact,  had  once  been  married  to  Bosco’s  nephew.    See id. at 1198 n.2.
See id. at 1210 (George, C.J., concurring).
See id.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 1202.
See id. at 1211.
Id.
See id. at 1210–11.
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Justice Werdegar, joined by Justices Baxter and Chin, held that Foley
and Erman were “care custodians.” The majority strictly adhered to the
text of Section 21350. It reasoned that the statute incorporates “[a]ny. . .
person” tendering “health services or social services” into the definition of
the term “care custodian.”130 At the same time, the majority noted that the
statute says nothing about the person’s vocation or history with the
dependent adult.131 The majority therefore overruled Shinkle, Davidson,
and McDowell to the extent they recognized “a professional or
occupational limitation” or “a preexisting personal friendship exception.”132
The majority noted that this “may in some instances result in inequity,” but
declined to second-guess the legislature.133
Finally, the majority
emphasized that Foley and Erman were not beneficiaries who only later
became “care custodians”; instead, they had never appeared in Bosco’s
testamentary instruments until after they had begun caring for her.134
Accordingly, because Foley and Erman had provided “substantial, ongoing
health services,” the majority voided the bequests to them.135
Chief Justice George concurred, reasoning that the case was a shining
example of why the legislature wisely refused to delineate between paid
and unpaid caregivers. The Chief Justice noted that even amateur
caregivers enjoy dominion over their charges.136 Yet the Chief Justice also
conceded that the statute could produce “counterintuitive” results.137 He
opined that less cause for skepticism exists when a dependent adult confers
a gift on a friend who “provide[s] substantial, ongoing health services. . .
for an extended period.”138 He therefore called on the legislature to add a
temporal element to the “care custodian” provision.139
Justice Corrigan, joined by Justices Kennard and Moreno, dissented.
Justice Corrigan took issue with the majority’s construction of the statute,
noting that the definition of “care custodian” contains twenty-four
examples of entities and institutions. Given that backdrop, Justice Corrigan

Id. at 1202 (majority opinion).
See id. at 1204.
Id. at 1202. Bizarrely, the majority later claimed to be overruling Shinkle, Davidson, and
McDowell “to   the   extent   they   interpreted   section   21350   as   allowing   for   a   preexisting   personal  
friendship exception,”   while   saying   nothing   about   Davidson and McDowell’s   discrete professional or
occupational exception. Id. at 1209 n.14. In light of the rest of the opinion, this must be an inadvertent
omission.
133 See id. at   1208   (“[W]e need not strain to discern (because we are not free to impose a
universally desirable result in terms of public policy.”)  (internal quotations omitted).
134 See id. at  1209  (“Foley  and  Erman  became  beneficiaries  of  the  Trust  only  pursuant  to  changes  
decedent made in her will while she was living with them and they were providing her with care
services.”).
135 Id. at 1197, 1202.
136 See id. at 1211 (George, C.J., concurring).
137 Id. at 1212.
138 Id. at 1211.
139 See id. at   1212   (proposing   that   a   bequest   created   “within   one   year   following   the
commencement of a new nonprofessional caregiving relationship or within one year preceding the death
of  the  dependent  adult,  will  be  subject  to  the  presumption  of  undue  influence”).
130
131
132
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explained, the catch-all phrase “[a]ny other. . . person providing health
services or social services” must be understood as encompassing others
“who provide[ ] care or assistance through some formal relationship, rather
than on a private friendship or familial basis.”140 Justice Corrigan also
doubted that lawmakers intended to disincentivize kindness and generosity:
In terms of public policy, it seems unwise to penalize Good Samaritans by
making them less eligible to receive the gratitude of those they help, the kinder
they have been. As the majority opinion points out, Foley and Erman welcomed
the decedent into their own home and performed a variety of challenging,
personal, and distasteful tasks to ease the burdens of her final illness. The law
should not cast a jaundiced eye on those who provide such care to family or
friends, and there is no reason to believe the Legislature intended such an
outcome.141

Finally, In re Estate of Odian142 followed Bernard and determined that
a “paid live-in companion” was a “care custodian.” In 2000, Helen Odian,
an eighty-four year-old who lived alone, hired Catharina Vulovic to shop,
cook, perform chores, and drive. Odian eventually asked Vulovic to live
with her in return for $500.00 per week.143 They spent holidays together.
Odian became close to Vulovic’s children. She told friends that “she
would not have lived as long” without Vulovic and “that she wanted to
leave her estate to [her].”144 In 2001, however, when a financial advisor
recommended that Odian prepare a trust, Odian explained that she wanted
to name charities as beneficiaries.145 The day before Odian’s appointment
to sign the trust, the financial advisor received a fax, written by Vulovic,
that Odian wanted to draft her own will. Odian then signed a form estate
plan—in which Vulovic had filled in all the blanks—that left her estate to
Vulovic. The financial advisor was unable to contact Odian afterwards.
An investigator from adult protective services and a psychologist met with
Odian and found her unable to recall details about her life, including
Vulovic’s name.146
The trial court voided the gifts on several grounds: incapacity, undue
influence, and the “care custodian” statute.147 The court of appeal affirmed.
The court reasoned that Bernard doomed Vulovic’s claims that the statute
did not apply because of her friendship with Odian or because she “was
arguably not a professional caregiver.”148 The court then addressed the
thornier issue of whether Vulovic had provided the kind of services that
makes one a “care custodian.” Vulovic argued that Davidson remained

140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148

Id. at 1213 (Corrigan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1214 (internal citations omitted).
51 Cal. Rptr. 3d 390, 392 (Ct. App. 2006).
Id. at 393.
Id.
Id. at 393.
Id. at 395.
Id. at 392.
See id. at 398–99.

HORTON

2008]

12/22/2008 1:15 PM

California’s  “Care  Custodian”  Statute

63

good law to the extent it suggested that “services such as cooking, cleaning,
shopping and driving do not amount to health or social services of a care
custodian.”149 Although the court agreed that this aspect of Davidson had
survived Bernard,150 it construed Davidson’s holding differently:
Davidson did not actually hold that services such as those are not social services
within the meaning of the statute. In Davidson, the court found, primarily, that
the beneficiary of the estate was not a care custodian because his role as the
decedent’s caregiver arose naturally from his long-term friendship with her and
not from his employment as a caregiver. Secondarily, the court questioned
whether services such as cooking, gardening, running errands, providing
transportation, grocery shopping and providing assistance with banking could be
equated with social services.151

Likewise, Odian noted that Bernard mentioned that “substantial and
ongoing health services” make one a “care custodian” but did not discuss
“social services.”152 Calling it “a question of first impression,” Odian held
that “an expansive interpretation of ‘social services’.  .  . best promotes the
Legislature’s objective of protecting vulnerable dependent adults from
exploitation.”153 Because Vulovic was a “paid live-in caregiver” who “took
care of [Odian’s] home” and “cooked, cleaned, and drove” Odian, the court
determined that she was a “care custodian.” 154
D.

The Current State of the Law

The most glaring problem with the definition of “care custodian” is
that it is virtually boundless: “[a]ny [other]. . . person[] providing health
services or social services to elders or dependent adults.”155 Even though
Bernard held that “health services” must be “substantial” and “ongoing,” it
conjured these limiting principles out of thin air156—an odd move in light

Id. at 399 (internal quotations omitted).
See id. at   399   n.7   (“In   Bernard, the court disapproved Davidson only to the extent that
Davidson held   that   section   21350(a)   allows   for   a   ‘preexisting   personal   friendship   exception.’      Thus,  
Davidson remains  citable  authority  with  respect  to  its  discussion  of  the  social  services  issue.”)  (internal
citations omitted).
151 Id. at 399–400 (internal citations omitted).
152 Id. at  400.    (“In   Bernard,  the  court  did  not  discuss  the  meaning  of  the  term  ‘social  services,’  
and it did not hold, as appellant contends, that only the provision of substantial ongoing health services
renders a caregiver a care custodian . . . .”).
153 Id. at 401.
154 Id. The court also held that Vulovic had failed to rebut the presumption under section 21351,
as she attacked the evidence offered against her, rather than offered affirmative evidence of her own.
See id. at 402.
155 See CAL. PROB. CODE § 21350(c) (West 2007); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 15610.17(y)
(West   2007).      Similarly,   the   term   “dependent   adult”   includes   any   person   over   sixty-four who has
“diminished  because  of  age.”    CAL. PROB. CODE § 21350(c) (West 2007); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §
15610.23(a) (West 2007). Of course, one would be hard-pressed to find anyone over sixty-four who did
not fit this bill.
156 Compare Bernard v. Foley, 139 P.3d 1196, 1197, 1202 (Cal. 2006) with id. at 1214 n.3
(Corrigan,  J.,  dissenting)  (“The  majority  imports  the  terms  substantial and ongoing care into the statute
without supporting citation of statutory language  or  legislative  history.”).
149
150
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of the majority’s textualist approach to statutory interpretation.157
Moreover, although Bernard took pains to point out that it might reach a
different result if “friends who were [already] testamentary beneficiaries of
a testator subsequently became care custodians”158—a situation in which
the caregiver would have little incentive to exploit the elder—the statute
does not address the issue. If Bernard could not create a preexisting
friendship exception in the face of legislative silence, then it cannot
defensibly create a preexisting beneficiary exception in the face of
legislative silence. Thus, as long as the California Supreme Court gives the
statutory language talismanic significance, one cannot minister to a senior
without running the risk of becoming a “care custodian.”159
The meaning of “social services” is equally, if not more, elusive.
Although Odian asserts that Davidson merely “questioned” whether duties
“such as cooking, gardening, running errands, providing transportation,
grocery shopping and. . . banking” could be “social services,”160 Odian is
incorrect. Davidson squarely held that “errands, chores, and household
tasks. . . cannot be equated with the provision of ‘health services and social
services.’”161 Odian’s self-proclaimed “expansive interpretation of ‘social
services’” better accords with Bernard’s reluctance to read exclusions into
the statute.162 Yet, if “social services” means nothing more than
“socializing” or “helping,”  then  Section 21350 sweeps within its ambit any
bequest from an elder to a friend. This cannot be the legislature’s intent.
One can rectify Odian with Davidson because Odian, unlike Davidson,
featured a salaried, live-in caregiver. Volovic shared almost every waking
moment with Odian, and thus had more of an opportunity to control her.163
Such distinctions, however, are born of common sense, not anything in the
definition of “care custodian.” Thus, the statute desperately needs reform.

157 See id. at 1204 (majority opinion) (rejecting   Foley   and   Erman’s   arguments   “[i]n   light   of   the  
statutory  language”).
158 Id. at 1209 (emphasis added).
159 The Bernard majority   dismissed   fairness   concerns   because   the   “certificate   of   independent  
review”  in  “section  21351  provides  a  clear  pathway  to  avoiding  section  21350.”    Id. at 1208. Yet after
practicing at an estate planning firm and researching both reported and unreported cases for this article,
I   have   never   heard   of   anyone   actually   using   the   “certificate   of   independent   review”   procedure. The
consensus among estate planning attorneys was that few testators were willing to pay for an
independent attorney to undertake the searching investigation necessary to rule out caretaker
overreaching. In addition, the specter of malpractice liability made them reluctant to participate in the
certification process.
160 Odian, 51 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 399–400.
161 Bernard v. Foley, 139 P.3d 1196, 1197, 1202 (Cal. 2006).
162 Odian, 51 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 402.
163 Compare id., 51 Cal. Rptr. 3d 390 with In re Conservatorship of Estate of Davidson, 6 Cal.
Rptr.  3d  702,  712  (Ct.  App.  2003)  (“during  the  time  period  most  relevant  to  this  case,  Davidson was
still  essentially  maintaining  her  independence”).
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II. THE LAW REVISION COMMISSION’S TENTATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS
The Law Revision Commission recently voted to limit the definition
of “care custodian” to paid caregivers:
21362. (a) “Care custodian” means a person who provides health or social
services to a dependent adult for compensation, as a profession or occupation.
The compensation need not be paid by the dependent adult.
(b) For the purposes of this section, “health and social services” include, but are
not limited to, the administration of medicine, medical testing, wound care,
housekeeping, shopping, cooking, transportation, assistance with hygiene, and
assistance with finances.164

The Commission also proposed (1) recasting “dependent adult” as
someone for whom “[a] court would have appointed a conservator for the
person. . . if a petition for conservatorship had been filed,”165 (2) clarifying
that the statute applies “only if the donative instrument was executed
during the period in which the care custodian provided services to the
transferor,”166 (3) reducing the burden on caregivers to disprove undue
influence167 from clear and convincing evidence to a preponderance of the
evidence, and (4) allowing caregivers to carry this burden solely through
the testimony of a “disqualified person.”168
These changes would ameliorate the statute’s fundamental defect—its
staggering breadth. In addition, restricting the term “care custodian” to
paid caregivers would align the text with its animating concerns about
those “hired to provide in-home care.”169 Yet the proposals also elucidate
that this area of law does not lend itself to regulation. Indeed, they raise
many new questions. Would the new definition of “care custodian”—an
individual who caretakes “for compensation, as a profession or
occupation”—apply to Volovic, who drew a salary but “had never
previously worked as a caregiver and was arguably not a professional
Cal.  Law  Revision  Comm’n,  supra note 21, at 19.
Id. at 19–20.
Id. at 21.
The  Commission  eliminates  the  statute’s  reference  to  “menace  or  duress,”  correctly  noting  that  
none of the rationales for the presumption justify “terms  of  art  that  describe  extreme  forms  of  coercion.”    
Id. at 5.
168 See Minutes of  Meeting,  California  Law  Revision  Comm’n,  April  10,  2008,  at  3,  5, available
at http://www.clrc.ca.gov/pub/Minutes/Minutes2008-04.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2008). Although an
express preexisting friendship exception could achieve many of these goals, it would also create
uncertainty  by  requiring  courts  to  define  a  “friend.” See, e.g., Ethan J. Leib, Friendship and the Law,
54 UCLA L. REV. 631, 638–47 (2007) (proposing a ten-factor  “set  of  criteria  [which]  may  be  useful  in  
delineating the contours of the friendship relation.”);;  Laura  A.  Rosenbury,  Friends With Benefits?, 106
MICH. L. REV. 189, 205 (2007) (noting that courts refuse to enforce instructions for a trustee to make
distributions to the settlor’s unidentified “friends”  for  lack  of  an  ascertainable beneficiary).
169 CAL. S. B. ANALYSIS., ASSEMB. B. 1172, July 8, 1997 (emphasis added); see also Kirsten M.
Kwasneski, Comment, The Danger of a Label: How Legal Interpretation   of   “Care   Custodian”   Can  
Frustrate  a  Testator’s  Wish  to  Make  a  Gift  to  a  Personal Friend, 36 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 269, 290
(2006) (proposing   that   the   Legislature   amend   section   21350   to   “encompasses   only   those   individuals  
who are in the occupation of providing caretaking services.”).
164
165
166
167

HORTON

66

12/22/2008 1:15 PM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 12:47

caregiver[?]”170 Why exempt C.J. Thompson in Shinkle, whose role as
ombudsman, for which he earned no “compensation,” gave him access to
sensitive financial information about elderly patients?171 What does the
slippery phrase “health services or social services” mean?172 As noted
above, these terms are so vague that they seem to encompass any manner
of providing assistance to an elder. They thus invite arbitrary line-drawing
regarding the nature and degree of chores; it is now unclear where
“unsophisticated care and attention”173 ends and full-blown “social
services” begin. Moreover, they contain a fundamental perversity—the
more kindness one displays toward an elder, the more likely it is that one
will be statutorily disinherited.174 Finally, what is it about the caregiving
relationship that justifies making caregivers, paid or otherwise,
“disqualified person[s]”? I examine this last question in the next section.
A.

Policy Rationales for Retaining the “Care Custodian” Provision

The Law Revision Commission offers three reasons for retaining the
“care custodian” provision: (1) caregivers have an opportunity to unduly
influence their patients; (2) “dependent adults” are especially vulnerable;
and (3) devises to caregivers are likely “unnatural.”175 I discuss each in
turn.
1. Opportunity to Exert Undue Influence
The Commission correctly notes that “[t]he intimacy, privacy, and
duration of a care custodian relationship provides a significant opportunity
to exert undue influence on a dependent adult.”176 But this may be equally
true of other relationships that would not fall within the revised statute: an
elder’s family, close friends, doctors, spiritual advisors, and volunteer
caregivers.
Moreover, courts routinely announce that the “mere
opportunity to influence the mind of the testator, even coupled with an
interest or a motive to do so, is not sufficient” to prove undue influence.177
Indeed, that is why California courts have demanded “a showing that the
beneficiary actively participated in the preparation of the will” and actually

In re Estate of Odian, 51 Cal. Rptr. 3d 390, 399 (Ct. App. 2006).
See Estate   of   Shinkle,   119   Cal.   Rptr.   2d   42,   54   (Ct.   App.   2002)   (“But   for   the   ombudsman  
program, Thompson would not have met Shinkle, would not have had access to her financial and
personal information, and would not have gained her trust.”).
172 The   Law   Revision   Commission’s   illustrative   list,   see supra note 21, does not answer this
question. It includes, but is not limited to “housekeeping,   shopping . . . transportation . . . [and]
assistance with finances”  (emphasis  added).
173 In re Conservatorship of Estate of Davidson, 6 Cal .Rptr. 3d 702, 713 (Ct. App. 2003).
174 Justice Corrigan alludes to this point. See Bernard v. Foley, 139 P.3d 1196, 1214 n.3 (Cal.
2006) (Corrigan, J., dissenting)   (“Those   who   provide   only   trivial or undependable care may inherit,
while those whose care is substantial and ongoing are not only to be denied, but also assessed costs and
attorney  fees.”).
175 See Cal.  Law  Revision  Comm’n,  supra note 21, at 7–8.
176 Id.
177 In re Welch’s  Estate,  272  P.2d  512,  514  (Cal.  1954).
170
171
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“affect[ed] the contents of the will” to shift the burden to the beneficiary.178
The “care custodian” provision only presumes that caregivers actively
participate in the preparation and execution of the will because of a
historical accident—Section 21350 first governed gifts to drafting
attorneys, who by definition create the will. The common law also
indulged in the sensible inference that lawyers actively participate in their
client’s will.179 Conversely, there is no inexorable tether between the act of
caregiving or the role of a caregiver and the contents of an elder’s estate
plan. Thus, to the extent the statute assumes that caregivers dictate their
patients’ testamentary instruments, its basis for doing so is unclear. To the
extent it dispenses with this requirement, it ignores a factor that California
courts have recognized as a telling indication of undue influence.
2. Vulnerability of “Dependent Adults”
The Commission explains that “a transferor may be dependent on a
care custodian for assistance with the necessities of life” and may also
suffer from debilitating conditions “that could make the transferor more
vulnerable to pressure and manipulation.”180 The Commission sets the
statute on firmer ground by changing the definition of “dependent adult”
from anyone over sixty-four181 to individuals who would require a
conservator.182
Nevertheless, evidence of a testator’s impairment does not factor into
the test for raising the presumption of undue influence. As such, making it
a pillar for a novel extension of the presumption is unusual. Although a
few cases have mentioned the testator’s susceptibility to bolster their
conclusion that a beneficiary obtained a gift by undue influence, the
general rule is that “proof of the testator’s mental weakness does not
establish more than a conjecture that the will is the result of undue
influence.”183 California courts have also required a testator to be severely
incapacitated to lose the right to devise property. Even being under a
conservatorship does not suffice.184 Thus, without significantly more, the
fact that “dependent adults” may be particularly vulnerable to undue
influence is not a persuasive basis for barring gifts to “care custodians.”
3. “Undue Profit” to Caregivers
Finally, and most importantly, the Commission contends that, “[a]n
estate plan may be considered unnatural if it provides a large gift to a
person who is not related to the transferor or is remotely related, while
178 Estate of Swetmann, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 457, 466 (Ct. App. 2000) (collecting cases); see also
Estate of Bould, 287 P.2d 8, 16 (Cal. Ct. App. 1955) (collecting cases).
179 Estate of Auen, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 557, 562 (Ct. App. 1994).
180 Cal.  Law  Revision  Comm’n,  supra note 21, at 8.
181 See supra note 155.
182 Cal. Law Revision  Comm’n,  supra  note  21, at 19–20.
183 William H. Lindsley et al., Wills, 64 CAL. JUR. 3D § 188 (2007) (collecting cases).
184 See Estate of Mann, 229 Cal. Rptr. 225, 230-31 (Ct. App. 1986).
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providing a less generous gift to close relations.”185 According to the
Commission, this rationale is a valid basis for distinguishing between paid
and unpaid caregivers: “While a large gift to a paid employee may appear
‘unnatural,’ the same gift to a friend or Good Samaritan may not.”186
Yet the hallmark of the “undue profit” element under California law—
what makes the state’s undue influence doctrine so progressive—is its factintensive flexibility.187 Indeed, the test calls for the judge to place herself
in the testator’s shoes—to disregard labels and examine the substance of
each relationship.188 The Law Revision Commission is absolutely correct
that some testamentary gifts to caregivers “may” seem unnatural, especially
if they come at the expense of close friends or family. But this will not
always be the case. For example, in Shinkle and Odian, the “care
custodian” provision invalidated transfers even though the caregivers were
closer to the testators in their final years than any other person.189 At the
same time, both cases featured strong countervailing evidence that called
the caregivers’ motives into question.190 Trial courts and the doctrine of
undue influence “exist[ ] to resolve”191 questions of whether a testamentary
gift is “natural” or whether a profit is “due.” A bright-line rule is a poor fit.
Moreover, not only is any assumption about “undue profit” troubling,
but this particular assumption—that all testamentary gifts to paid caregivers
are “undue”—is hardly convincing. Caregivers make little money,192 rarely
have health insurance,193 and perform invaluable and often distasteful tasks.
Elders “need catheters, oxygen tanks, and wheelchairs. They need
someone to put a spoon in their mouths, to get them on the toilet, to pull on
their socks, and to remind them what day it is. They need someone to
oversee an arsenal of medications and a cadre of medical specialists.”194
Indeed, “[i]ndividuals with three or four chronic illnesses have 8 to 14
physicians taking care of them. The complexity for caregivers is a
tremendous challenge.”195 Especially in states such as California, where

Cal. Law Revision  Comm’n,  supra note 21, at 8.
Id.
See supra note 52, at 564.
See id.
Estate  of  Shinkle,  119  Cal.  Rptr.  2d  42,  50  (Ct.  App.  2002)  (noting  that  the  testator’s  closest
relative was a cousin whom she had not seen for four decades); In re Estate of Odian, 51 Cal. Rptr. 3d
390, 392–93 (Ct. App. 2006).
190 See Shinkle, 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 47–48 (Ct. App. 2002) (noting that Thompson suggested that
Shinkle make an estate plan and was close behind her during meetings with her lawyer); Odian, 51 Cal.
Rptr. 3d at 394 (noting that Volovic apparently isolated Odian and filled out her will for her).
191 Bernard v. Foley, 139 P.3d 1196, 1215 (Cal. 2006) (Corrigan, J., dissenting).
192 See supra notes 5–6 and accompanying text.
193 See Bob Moos, Who’ll  Care  for  Aging  Boomers?, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 4, 2007, at
1A, available at 2007 WLNR 12671984 (estimating that only half of caregivers have health insurance,
and  “[i]f  a  caregiver  has  coverage,  it’s  usually  because  of  a  spouse  or  another  job.”).
194 Elder Care Challenges and Solutions: Hearing Before the Senate Joint Econ. Comm., 116th
Cong. (2007) (testimony of Virginia Morris), available at 2007 WLNR 9245900.
195 Michael Vitez, National Conference on Aging Delivers Wake-up Call to Boomers, PHILA.
INQUIRER, Mar. 11, 2007, at A4, available at 2007 WLNR 4598239.
185
186
187
188
189
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seniors often have valuable illiquid assets, such as real estate, a senior
could very well want to reward a caregiver for his or her efforts but be
unable to do so during life. Thus, there should be nothing inherently
suspect about a bequest to a paid caregiver.
CONCLUSION
The “care custodian” provision casts a long shadow over California
probate law. Currently, its definitions are so broad, and exceptions so
narrow, that it is doctrinally and theoretically incoherent. As the law now
stands, when an unrelated beneficiary helps an elder in any fashion, they do
so at their own peril. The California Law Revision Commission’s tentative
recommendations would circumscribe the statute and thus are a good first
step. But before its mandate to rethink the statute expires, the Commission
should seriously consider whether to abandon the “care custodian”
provision once and for all.

